Privacy-Friendly Mobility Analytics using Aggregate Location Data by Pyrgelis, A et al.
Privacy-Friendly Mobility Analytics using
Aggregate Location Data
Apostolos Pyrgelis
University College London
apostolos.pyrgelis.14@ucl.ac.uk
Emiliano De Cristofaro
University College London
e.decristofaro@ucl.ac.uk
Gordon J. Ross
University College London
gordon.ross@ucl.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Location data can be extremely useful to study commuting pat-
terns and disruptions, as well as to predict real-time traffic volumes.
At the same time, however, the fine-grained collection of user lo-
cations raises serious privacy concerns, as this can reveal sensitive
information about the users, such as, life style, political and reli-
gious inclinations, or even identities. In this paper, we study the
feasibility of crowd-sourced mobility analytics over aggregate lo-
cation information: users periodically report their location, using
a privacy-preserving aggregation protocol, so that the server can
only recover aggregates – i.e., how many, but not which, users are
in a region at a given time. We experiment with real-world mobil-
ity datasets obtained from the Transport For London authority and
the San Francisco Cabs network, and present a novel methodol-
ogy based on time series modeling that is geared to forecast traffic
volumes in regions of interest and to detect mobility anomalies in
them. In the presence of anomalies, we also make enhanced traffic
volume predictions by feeding our model with additional informa-
tion from correlated regions. Finally, we present and evaluate a mo-
bile app prototype, called Mobility Data Donors (MDD), in terms
of computation, communication, and energy overhead, demonstrat-
ing the real-world deployability of our techniques.
1. INTRODUCTION
The availability of information about people’s locations and
movements holds the promise to make urban planning more ef-
fective and efficient, and ultimately improve citizens’ quality of
life. Prompted by the increased presence of always-on, always-
connected devices, the ubiquitous collection of location informa-
tion enables a number of interesting applications. New research
frontiers, e.g., in the field of anticipatory mobile computing, make
it increasingly possible to use mobile sensing along with machine
learning for intelligent reasoning [32]. For instance, contextual lo-
cation information collected from mobile users can be used to pre-
dict future mobility events [26, 39], detect mobility anomalies [30]
and enable real-time traffic or event statistics [4].
At the same time, however, large-scale collection of individual
users’ fine-grained locations raises serious privacy concerns, as this
can reveal sensitive information about the users, such as, life style,
political and religious inclinations, or even identities [31, 24]. Al-
though often advocated, anonymization of location traces is moot
as these reveal home/work locations, which in turn can be used to
re-identify users [18]. In fact, just a few locations are enough to
re-identify users [43]. Therefore, in this paper, we set to investigate
whether or not mobility analytics can be effectively and efficiently
performed over aggregate data. We turn to cryptographic proto-
cols for privacy-friendly data aggregation and use them to privately
gather location statistics [9, 23, 28, 34]. Overall, we aim to demon-
strate: (1) the usefulness of mobility analytics over aggregate loca-
tions, and (2) the real-world deployability of a scalable system for
privacy-friendly location data collection.
Roadmap. We present a crowd-sourced system for privacy-
friendly mobility analytics whereby users periodically report lo-
cations, but do so using a privacy-preserving aggregation protocol,
so that only aggregates can be recovered (i.e., how many but not
which users were in a region at a given time). We experiment with
real-world mobility datasets obtained from the Transport For Lon-
don (TFL) authority as well as the San Francisco Cabs (SFC) net-
work, and present a methodology based on time series modeling
geared to forecast traffic volumes in regions of interest (ROIs) and
to detect mobility anomalies in them. In the presence of anomalies,
we also make enhanced traffic volume predictions (achieving up
to 50% improvement) by training our model with additional infor-
mation from correlated regions. Such tasks are particularly useful
in modern cities for journey planning [4, 26] and congestion pre-
vention [38]. Finally, we show how to build a privacy-respecting
system for data collection. To this end, we present a mobile app
prototype, called Mobility Data Donors (MDD), and present an
empirical evaluation of its computation, communication, and en-
ergy complexities, which attest to the practicality of our vision.
Paper Organization. Next section introduces a few concepts and
tools used in our work, then, Section 3 presents our datasets and
our methodology for predictive mobility analytics. In Section 4, we
discuss the details of our proposed framework and analyze its real-
world deployment. Finally, after reviewing related work in Sec-
tion 5, the paper concludes in Section 6.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Auto Regressive Moving Average
As we aim to perform analytics on aggregate locations – specif-
ically, predicting traffic volumes as well as detecting mobility
anomalies in a Region Of Interest (ROI), such as underground sta-
tions (cf. Section 3.2–3.3) – we model ROIs’ time series using
Auto-Regressive Moving Average (ARMA). We build on the work
by Box et al. [8], who present an iterative method for choosing and
estimating ARMA models.
Given a time series Yt, an ARMA model is a tool for under-
standing and predicting future values in Yt. The model is usually
denoted asARMA(p, q), whereAR(p) denotes the autoregressive
model of order p and MA(q) refers to the moving average model
of order q. Specifically, an ARMA(p, q) model is defined as:
Yt = c+
p∑
i=1
φi · Yt−i + t +
q∑
i=1
θi · t−i (1)
where c is a constant, φ1, . . . , φp and θ1, . . . , θq are model param-
eters, and t, t−1, . . . are white noise error terms.
2.2 Vector Auto-Regression
We also investigate how to improve traffic volume predictions in
the presence of anomalies (cf. Section 3.4), thus, we also attempt to
discover correlated ROIs and use their aggregate time series, along
with a Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) model, to make enhanced
predictions. VARs are statistical models used in econometrics to
capture linear interdependencies among multiple time series, and
consist a generalization of uni-variate autoregressive models (AR
models) that allow more than one evolving variable. All variables
in a VAR model are treated symmetrically and each of them has
an equation explaining its evolution based on its own lags as well
as those of the other model variables. VAR modeling requires the
prior knowledge of a list of variables which can be hypothesized to
affect each other inter-temporally.
A VAR model describes the evolution of a set of k variables (en-
dogenous variables) over a sample period t = 1, . . . , T as a linear
function of their past values. The variables are collected in a vector
yt of size (k, 1), whose ith element yit is the observation of the
variable i at time t. A p-th order VAR model, denoted as V AR(p)
is given by the equation:
yt = c+A1 · yt−1 +A2 · yt−2 + . . . Ap · yt−p + et (2)
where c is a vector of constants with size (k, 1), Ai is a time-
invariant matrix of size (k, k) and et is a vector of error terms with
size (k, 1) where: (a) E(et) = 0, every error term has mean zero,
(b)E(ete
′
t) = Ω, the co-variance matrix of error terms is Ω and (c)
E(ete
′
t−k) = 0, for any non-zero k there is no serial correlation in
individual error terms.
2.3 Spearman Correlation
To discover correlated ROIs, we will use Spearman’s correlation
coefficient, which is a non-parametric measure of the statistical de-
pendence between the ranking of two variables [12]. It provides an
estimate of how well the relationship between two variables can be
described with a monotonic function and, unlike Pearson, it does
not assume that both variables are normally distributed. Given two
variables W,Z, the Spearman correlation coefficient is defined as:
rs = 1− 6 ·
∑
d2i
n · (n2 − 1) (3)
where di = rg(Wi) − rg(Zi) is the difference between the two
ranks of each observation and n is the number of observations.
Similar to other correlation measures, Spearman’s obtains values
between −1 and +1, with 0 implying no correlation, and −1 or
+1 implying an exact monotonic relationship. Intuitively, positive
correlations imply that as W increases, so does Z, while negative
correlations mean that as W increases, Z decreases.
2.4 Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation
We also use cryptographic protocols for privacy-preserving data
aggregation, allowing an untrusted aggregator to gather statistics
(e.g., sum or mean) from users in such a way that data of single
users is not revealed in the clear, but only the aggregate information
can be recovered. These protocols are often used for smart meter-
ing [25], participatory sensing [34], or recommender systems [28].
Typically, private aggregation relies on a cryptosystem that is ad-
ditively homomorphic: users send encrypted data to the aggregator,
which does not hold the corresponding decryption key and cannot
access single users’ contributions, however, it can decrypt the sum
of all users’ reports. Specifically, we choose a protocol recently
proposed by Melis et al. [28], as it guarantees: scalability, indepen-
dence from trusted third parties and/or key distribution centers, and
fault tolerance. Scalability is achieved by combining the private ag-
gregation protocol of Kursawe et al. [25] (secure under the Compu-
tational Diffie Hellman assumption in the presence of honest-but-
curious adversaries) with data structures supporting succinct data
representation, i.e., Count-Min Sketches [13]. These introduce a
small, upper-bounded error in the aggregation, but reduce the com-
putational/communication complexities of the cryptographic oper-
ations from linear to logarithmic in the size of the input. It also
features a completely distributed key generation/distribution which,
unlike other protocols, e.g. [22, 34], does not require any other au-
thorities. Finally, its fault tolerance protocol addresses one of the
main limitations of [25], i.e., if one or more users fails to report
their (encrypted) data, the aggregator cannot correctly decrypt the
aggregate (since it relies on encryption keys summing up to zero).
Melis et al. [28]’s protocol consists of four phases. (1) Setup:
Assuming a cyclic group G of order q for which the Computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard, and g a generator of this
group, each user Ui ∈ U = {1, . . . , N} generates a private key
xi ∈r G (i.e., sampled at random from G) and a public key
yi = g
xi mod q. The public keys are published with the aggre-
gator. (2) Encryption: Each user Ui holds an input vector of data
points S = {Sc ∈ N, c = {1, . . . , T}}. To participate in the
privacy-preserving aggregation each user needs to generate blind-
ing factors based on the public keys of the other users in such a
way that they all sum up to zero. At round s, for l = 1, . . . , T ,
user Ui computes kil =
∑N
j=1,j 6=iH(y
xi
j ‖l‖s) · (−1)i>jmod q,
where H is a cryptographic hash function and ‖ denotes the con-
catenation operator. Then, for each entry {Sil}Tl=1, Ui encrypts
Sil as bil = Sil + kilmod 232 and sends the resulting ciphertext
to the aggregator. (3) Aggregation: The aggregator collects the
ciphertexts from each user Ui and (obliviously) aggregates them.
More precisely, for l = 1, . . . , T it computes Cl =
∑N
i=1 bil =∑N
i=1 kil +
∑N
i=1 Sil =
∑N
i=1 Silmod 2
32, where Cl denotes the
l− th item of the input vector S. (4) Fault Recovery: If, during the
aggregation phase, only a subset of users Uon successfully submit
data, the aggregator sends Uon to each Ui ∈ Uon and Ui com-
putes, for each l = 1, . . . , T , k
′
il =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i,j /∈Uon H(y
xi
j ‖l‖s) ·
(−1)i>jmod q. Then each user Ui sends these values back to to
the aggregator who can now obtain the aggregate counts by com-
puting C
′
l = (
∑
i∈Uon bil −
∑
i∈Uon k
′
il)mod 2
32.
Groups. Another feature of [28] is the ability to dynamically al-
locate users in groups, and perform within-group aggregation and
then combining statistics from multiple groups, which is crucial
to cope with dynamic/mobile settings. It also allows to bound the
complexity of the encryption phase, which depends on the number
of users in the group.
Input Compression. As mentioned above, [28] uses Count-Min
Sketches to guarantee scalability when the input vector (S) is large.
Specifically, the encryption phase is modified as follows: each user
Ui initializes a Count-Min Sketch vector Xi ∈ Nd×w with zero
entries, then encodes his original input vector S using the update
procedure of Count-Min Sketches [13] while employing the fol-
lowing pairwise hash function: h(x) = ((a ·x+ b)mod p)modw
for a 6= 0, b random integers modulo a random prime p. Then each
user encrypts Xi as in the previously described encryption phase.
If |S| denotes the size of the input vector S, its compact represen-
tation with a Count-Min Sketch has size O(log(|S|)). More pre-
cisely, given the sketch parameters (, δ), the Count-Min Sketch is
a vector of sizeL = d×w where d = dln (|S|/δ)e andw = de/e.
For instance, if  = δ = 0.01, a vector S of size |S| = 104 can
be encoded as a sketch of size L = 3, 808, while a vector S of size
|S| = 106 can be represented as a sketch of size L = 5, 168. Ob-
viously, the Count-Min succinct structure introduces an accuracy
error and its parameters (, δ) give an upper bounded error for the
estimated counters cˆi, amounting to cˆi ≤ ci +  ·∑j |cj | with
probability 1− δ (with ci being the true element of the vector).
3. MOBILITY ANALYTICS USING
AGGREGATE LOCATIONS
We now present and evaluate our “mobility analytics” algo-
rithms, specifically, predicting traffic volumes at ROIs, discovering
and predicting anomalies – all using aggregate location reports. We
rely on two real-world datasets obtained, respectively, from Trans-
port for London (TFL) and the San Francisco Cab (SFC) network.
3.1 Datasets
3.1.1 Transport For London (TFL)
London’s transportation system consists of various connected
subsystems: London Underground Ltd (LUL), London Transport
Buses (LTB), Docklands Light Rail (DLR), Overground (LRC),
Tramlink (TRAM), and National Rail (NR), operating in the city
under the umbrella of Transport for London (TFL). The most com-
mon payment method for TFL fares is the Oyster Card, a pre-paid,
RFID-enabled card. We have obtained from TFL data correspond-
ing to all March 2010 trips from all (anonymized) oyster cards,
which we pre-process in the following way. First, we discard trips
from TRAM due to scarce density and LTB for consistency as trav-
elers only tap-in but do not tap-out for bus trips paid by Oyster.
Then, to observe weekly patterns, we focus on the four weeks from
Monday March 1 to Sunday 28, 2010. The final dataset consists
of approximately 60 million oyster-card trips, performed by almost
4 million unique users, over 582 stations. Each entry in the data
describes a unique trip and consists of the following fields: oyster
id, start time, start station id, end time, and end station id. Note
that the time resolution of the timestamps is 1 minute.
Next, we aggregate single-trip records by grouping trips start and
end times in time epochs of 1 hour, aiming to achieve regularity in
transit patterns (similar to [45]), and count the number of passen-
gers that entered (“tap-in”) or exited (“tap-out”) each station during
a slot. For each station i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (with n being the total num-
ber of stations), we create a time series Yit indicating how many
passengers transited through it in a time epoch t ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (m
denotes the total number of epochs, i.e., 672): Yit = Y init + Y
out
it ,
where Y init indicates the number of tap-in events and Y
out
it the num-
ber of tap-out events, at station i during epoch t.
In Figure 1, we plot the hourly aggregate time series of two sta-
tions – Canary Wharf (one of the busiest stations of London) and
Clapham Common (a moderately busy station) – showing different
patterns during weekdays and weekends, as well as peak commut-
ing hours. In general, we note some weekly/daily seasonality in the
stations’ time series as well as stationarity (i.e., no particular trend).
We verify the latter by performing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test [14] which indicates that 93% of tube stations have stationary
time series with 95% confidence.
3.1.2 San Francisco Cab (SFC)
We also use the San Francisco Cab (SFC) dataset [33], which
contains mobility traces recorded by taxis in San Francisco, be-
tween May 17 to June 10, 2008. The dataset contains approxi-
mately 11 million GPS coordinates, generated by 536 taxis. To
observe weekly patterns in our data we sample the dataset to cover
(a)
(b)
Figure 1: Hourly traffic volume at two TFL stations (March 1–28, 2010).
Figure 2: Number of cabs on 100× 100 SF grid (May 19 – June 8, 2008).
exactly 3 weeks of data: Monday May 19 to Sunday June 8, 2008.
Entries in the dataset include the following fields: cab identifier,
latitude, longitude and a time stamp in UNIX epoch format.
We follow a similar approach as with the TFL dataset to ag-
gregate the traces, however, since locations are GPS coordinates
rather than points of interest, we divide the city of San Francisco
into a grid S consisting of 100 × 100 regions, each covering an
area of 0.19 × 0.14 square miles. We group the GPS traces in
one-hour epochs and, for each region i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (with n be-
ing the total number of regions, i.e., 10,000), we count the number
of taxis that have reported a presence in that block during epoch
t ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (m being the number of time epochs, i.e., 504),
and create a time series Yit as: Yit =
∑k
j=1 pjt, where k is the
total number of taxis (i.e., 536) and pjt ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether
taxi j ∈ {1, . . . , k} reported its location at region i during epoch t.
We aggregate the traffic from our 3-week dataset for each region
and, in Figure 2, plot the resulting heatmap. Unsurprisingly, the
downtown area exhibits the highest traffic volume, with the route
to/from SFO airport also clearly visible. In Figure 3, we plot the
aggregate time series of two regions, one of the busiest (id = 7160)
and a moderately busy one (id = 8554). Once again, weekly and
daily patterns can be observed, along with stationarity (96 out of
the 100 busiest regions have stationary time series with 99% confi-
dence as indicated by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test).
3.1.3 Removing Seasonality
(a)
(b)
Figure 3: Hourly traffic volume in regions 7160 and 8554 of SFC dataset.
Our preliminary analysis of both datasets shows that aggregate
time series of the ROIs (tube stations or regions) exhibit no partic-
ular trend but do preserve weekly/daily seasonality. Therefore, as
proposed in prior work, e.g., [21], we de-seasonalize each region’s
time series via additive decomposition. More specifically:
Dit = Yit − Y¯it (4)
where Yit is the ROI’s original time series i and Y¯it is its sea-
sonality defined as Y¯it = 1w
∑
Yidh, with w being the num-
ber of weeks in the dataset, d the day of the week (i.e., d ∈
{Monday, . . . , Sunday}), and h ∈ {0, . . . , l} with l denoting the
number of epochs in one day (24 since we aggregate hourly). Ob-
serve that Y¯it is a time series containing the average value of each
specific time slot (e.g., Mondays 3pm – 4pm). As an example,
Figure 4 shows Green Park station’s (a station among the busiest
TFL stations) aggregate time series in both its original and de-
seasonalized form. Note a negative spike on the morning hours
of March 8, as the station must have probably had reduced access
(e.g. due to partial closure). In general, the de-seasonalized ROIs’
time series show strong auto-regressive structure.
3.2 Predicting Traffic Volumes in ROIs
We now investigate how to make hourly traffic volume predic-
tions on ROIs using the TFL and SFC time series. Such predictions
are particularly useful in modern cities for journey planning [26,
39], congestion prevention [38] as well as improving transportation
service levels and adjusting staff needs at stations [2].
We focus on the 100 busiest TFL stations and the 100 most pop-
ular SFC regions. Since our preliminary analysis shows that ROIs’
time series are stationary and exhibit strong auto-regressive struc-
ture, we turn to ARMA modeling (cf. Section 2.1). For each ROI
i, we feed the ARMA model with the values of the last 6 days
of its aggregate and de-seasonalized time series Yit, Dit, respec-
tively. We train the model using the first 5 days of Dit and test it
against the last (“test day”) of Yit following a recursive approach
with a sliding time window to predict its hourly traffic. To do so,
for each time slot we combine ARMA model’s predictions on Dit
with ROI’s seasonality Y¯it, therefore, our predictions are given by
Yˆit = Dˆit + Y¯it, where Dˆit is the ARMA prediction on the ROI’s
de-seasonalized time series and Y¯it its seasonality.
We then compare our approach against a baseline, i.e., a black
(a)
(b)
Figure 4: Green Park station’s time series without (a) and with (b) de-
seasonalization.
(a)
(b)
Figure 5: Hourly traffic forecasts for Green Park station on March 25.
box approach where we fit the ARMA model directly on each ROI’s
i time series Yit. We evaluate the accuracy of the predictions using
the absolute forecast error as eit =| Yit− Yˆit |, where Yit is the ac-
tual time series value at time slot t (ground truth) and Yˆit is the pre-
dicted value for that time slot using our approach. We also convert
the error into a percentage error, i.e., pit = eitYit × 100. Figure 5(a)
plots the traffic volume forecast for Green Park station on March
25, while Figure 5(b) shows the absolute forecast error. Overall,
on the TFL dataset, the mean absolute forecast error for March 25,
over the 100 busiest stations, is 59.53 ± 42.48 oysters, compared
to 545.9 ± 376.8 oysters with the baseline. This corresponds to
an error of 19.6% ± 59.5% vs 638% ± 1619%, showing that the
seasonality-based method significantly outperforms the baseline.
We follow the same approach for the SFC dataset, predicting
the traffic volume of the most popular regions. Figure 6 shows
the predictions and the forecast error for the region with identifier
8755, on June 5. The average forecast error over the 100 busiest
regions is 5.62±3.12 taxis (19.7%±10.3%), whereas, the baseline
(a)
(b)
Figure 6: Hourly traffic forecasts for SFC’s region 8755 on June 5.
error is 9.07 ± 2.95 (35.4% ± 13.4%), once again showing that
predictions can be improved when considering seasonal effects.
3.3 Detecting Traffic Anomalies
Next, we focus on detecting traffic volume anomalies on ROIs’
time series. This is particularly important for traffic provision-
ing and travel planning as trip recommendations can be made to
drivers/commuters during road accidents, incidents or events that
cause overcrowding in transportation stations [3, 4, 30].
Once again, we utilize ARMA modeling: our intuition is to train
the model for each ROI and rely on the absolute forecast error as a
confidence interval for detecting anomalies. More precisely, since
the forecast error is normally distributed, we apply the 3σ rule and
set upper and lower confidence intervals λ1, λ2. Thus, we detect
an anomaly when: et > λ1 ‖ et < λ2, where ‖ is the logical OR
operator, λ1 = µ + 3σ, λ2 = µ − 3σ, and µ, σ are, respectively,
average and standard deviation of the forecast error et. In a way,
we flag as anomalies time slots that our model could not predict
with good accuracy.
Subsequently, we experiment with our anomaly detection tech-
nique using a similar approach to that described in Section 3.2: we
train the ARMA model using data of the first week of each ROI’s
time series and test it against the remaining weeks (i.e., for the TFL
dataset we have 3 test weeks while for the SFC we have 2), using
a sliding window, aiming to identify traffic volume anomalies. We
focus on the 100 busiest stations of the TFL dataset and detect 896
anomalies, which roughly corresponds to 2% of all 1-hour slots in
the 3 test weeks. In the SFC dataset, over the 100 busiest regions,
we find 366 anomalies (i.e., 1% of the 2 test week time slots). We
rank each anomaly based on its deviation from the confidence inter-
vals as a measure of its magnitude and keep track of the top 10% of
anomalies, i.e., 90 anomalies for the TFL dataset and 30 for SFC:
in Section 3.4, we will investigate whether or not we can enhance
traffic prediction in the presence of anomalies by combining infor-
mation from correlated ROIs.
Note that we do not have ground truth as to what constitutes an
actual “anomaly” in our datasets, so we cannot empirically eval-
uate how well our approach corresponds to detecting, e.g., events,
strikes, disruptions, etc., and anyway this would be out of the scope
of our work. In general, we consider an anomaly to be a pattern that
does not conform to expected normal behavior [10] and, as such,
(a)
(b)
Figure 7: Original time series, forecasts, and detected anomalies in (a)
North Greenwich station, March 9–11, and (b) Wembley Park station,
March 11–12.
our anomaly detection techniques really consist in automatically
flagging such patterns using aggregate locations. By focusing on
the top events in terms of deviation from the confidence intervals
(i.e., unexpectedly increased/decreased traffic patterns in ROIs),
we aim to investigate whether collecting information from multi-
ple ROIs can improve traffic volume predictions in the presence of
anomalies (see Section 3.4).
We discuss some case studies among the top anomalies that we
were able to correlate with external events. As shown in previous
work [36], distinct human mobility patterns are observed during
events that attract big crowds like football matches or music con-
certs. In Figures 7(a) and 7(b), we plot “anomalies” we detect in
North Greenwich and Wembley Park tube stations, on the evening
hours of March 10 and March 11. This seems to correspond to con-
certs taking place in the O2 and Wembley arenas, which are venues
close to those stations. These events likely cause increased traffic
spikes at nearby stations. Similarly, Figure 8(a) shows the original
aggregate time series of Arsenal station as well as the anomalies de-
tected on it when fitting our model. We can observe that the model
detects anomalies on the evening of March 20, when an Arsenal FC
soccer game was taking place. Finally, Figure 8(b) does the same
for a region (id 8261) in the SFC dataset that is nearby AT&T Park,
showing increased taxi traffic on the evening of May 31, when the
San Francisco Giants were playing a baseball match.
3.4 Predicting Traffic Volumes in Case of
Anomalies
We now investigate how to improve ROI traffic volume predic-
tions in the presence of anomalies, using additional information
from correlated ROIs. To this end, for each ROI, we use Spear-
man correlation (see Section 2) in order to discover those ROIs
whose traffic can be useful for enhancing our predictions. Sub-
sequently, we train a VAR model – geared to capture linear de-
pendencies among multiple time series – with the time series of a
ROI as well as the time series of its correlated ROIs and we com-
pare the prediction results against a local model, i.e., an ARMA
model trained only with ROI’s past local information (note that the
ARMA model described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 now consists our
baseline). In the rest of this section, for each of our datasets, we
(a)
(b)
Figure 8: Original time series, forecasts, and detected anomalies in (a)
Arsenal station, March 19–22, and (b) SFC region 8261, May 31–June 1.
start by describing our approach on a specific case study and then
we generalize our results by focusing on the top events (90 for TFL
and 30 for SFC, respectively) that our anomaly detection module
has flagged as possible anomalies.
TFL. We first focus on Saturday March 20, when our anomaly
detection module spots anomalies – i.e., increased traffic volume
– on the Arsenal station, likely caused by an Arsenal FC soccer
game. We zoom in on the two hours before and after the game
(15:00–17:00, resp., 19:00–21:00, respectively) when the majority
of Arsenal fans, exit from, resp., enter Arsenal station. We follow
a similar aggregation approach as that described in Section 3.1 al-
though now for each station i, we keep two separate time series:
one counting passengers entering the station (Y init ) and one count-
ing those exiting it (Y outit ). Once again, we de-seasonalize each
station’s entering/exiting time series as discussed in Section 3.1.3.
To discover stations correlated with Arsenal, we compute the
Spearman correlation (see Section 2) between the de-seasonalized
time series of passengers entering/exiting Arsenal as well as the
de-seasonalized time series of all the remaining stations in the TFL
network, by sliding them up to 1 hour earlier/later. Our results show
that the traffic exiting at Arsenal is highly correlated with the traf-
fic entering at various other TFL stations including Arnos Grove,
King’s Cross, Leicester Square, Blackhorse Road and Cockfosters
(i.e., stations on the same line with Arsenal or on a line connected
with the line of Arsenal). We then set to improve the traffic vol-
ume predictions of passengers exiting at Arsenal station before the
match, by feeding a model with the de-seasonalized entering time
series of the correlated stations. To do so, we use a vector autore-
gression model (VAR) (see Section 2) which describes the evolu-
tion of a set of variables over the same sample period as a linear
function of their past values. Figure 9 shows traffic volume pre-
dictions for passengers exiting Arsenal station using the ARMA
model with local information (i.e., the station’s past exiting time
series, which now consists our baseline) and using the VAR model
enhanced with additional information from the 10 most correlated
stations. We observe that the enhanced model makes significantly
better predictions between 15:00–17:00 on March 20, where we
observe increased traffic due to the game. We measure the average
forecast error of the exit traffic predictions of Arsenal on that day
as 133.9± 270.6 oysters (i.e. 93%± 185%) when making predic-
Figure 9: Forecast of passengers exiting Arsenal station March 19–21
based on a local ARMA model only vs. the VAR model with information
from correlated stations.
tions with local information only and 65.26 ± 135.04 oysters (or
59.1%± 57.4%) when enhancing it with the correlated stations.
In relation to the same event, we discover high correlation be-
tween the time series of passengers entering at Arsenal and those
exiting at Arnos Grove a time slot later. Thus, we enhance the lo-
cal ARMA prediction of traffic exiting volume at Arnos Grove by
feeding the model with the de-seasonalized traffic entering Arsenal.
Again, we use VAR to calculate the appropriate values for the pa-
rameters. The enhanced model makes better predictions between
19:00 and 21:00 where there was increased exiting traffic due to
the Arsenal game. Indeed, the average forecast error for March 20
decreases from 23.38 ± 48.79 oysters to 11.22 ± 18.61, a 52%
average improvement in traffic volume predictions.
Next, we apply our approach for all the top 90 anomalies found
in the TFL dataset (cf. Section 3.3), i.e., for each station under the
presence of an anomaly, we predict its exiting or entering traffic
(depending on which direction the anomaly has been detected) us-
ing a VAR model trained with the exiting or entering time series
(again, depending on the anomaly direction) from 10 correlated
stations. We measure the average forecast error over the day of
the anomaly and we compare it against a local approach (ARMA
model), where predictions are made using only past station’s infor-
mation. Overall, for the 90 anomalies of the TFL dataset, we ob-
serve a 29%± 13% improvement in our predictions when employ-
ing the VAR model, indicating that sharing information between
correlated ROIs improves prediction quality.
SFC. We follow a similar approach for anomalies detected on
the SFC dataset. Our correlation analysis shows that the de-
seasonalized time series of neighboring regions have high corre-
lation, as it is likely that they are connected by the same roads. For
instance, if we focus on the anomaly detected in region 8556 be-
tween May 27–28, we observe a 41% improvement in predictions
when training a VAR model including additional information from
5 correlated regions (i.e., block regions with ids 8557, 8657, 8558,
8655 and 8555) compared to the baseline, i.e., the ARMA model
that predicts using only local information. Similar to our TFL ex-
periments, we generalize this approach by trying to improve the
predictions for the top 30 anomalies of the SFC dataset, enhancing
our model with information from 5 correlated regions. In this case,
we obtain a 18%± 14% average improvement on the prediction.
Discussion. We observe that our techniques discussed above yield
better improvements over the TFL dataset compared to SFC. A pos-
sible explanation arises from the nature of the TFL dataset and the
way passenger trips are aggregated, i.e., at station level while pre-
serving the notion of direction (number of passengers exiting or
entering a station). This allows us to perform a more fine-grained
correlation analysis in comparison to the SFC dataset, where as we
aggregate the GPS locations, we lose the granularity of each taxi’s
trajectories (i.e., taxi moving from one region to another). While
this is a good feature vis-a-vis privacy guarantees, it motivates the
need to gather (privacy-friendly) aggregate location statistics while
preserving directions.
4. A SYSTEM FOR PRIVACY-FRIENDLY
MOBILITY ANALYTICS
After having assessed the usefulness of collecting and using ag-
gregate locations for mobility analytics, we now set to investigate
how to enable such collection in a privacy-friendly way. To this
end, we design a distributed, collaborative framework whereby
users install an application – called Mobility Data Donors (MDD)
– that regularly monitors their locations, stores it locally, and peri-
odically reports it to our server in a privacy-friendly way.1 Privacy
is guaranteed through aggregation, by means of the scalable pri-
vate aggregation protocol presented in Section 2.4, thus, the server
only learns aggregate information, i.e., how many (but not which)
users were in a particular region or entered/exited a particular un-
derground station in an interval of time. Once the server has re-
ceived the aggregate location data (i.e., counts of users’ presence in
ROIs), it can use it for mobility analytics applications.
As discussed earlier, protecting privacy of user locations is crit-
ical, as sensitive data about individuals, such as their religion [31]
or their identity [18] can be inferred, and even a few locations are
enough to re-identify users from anonymized traces [43]. The abil-
ity to privately collect location reports enables applications that
would otherwise be impossible due to privacy concerns. For in-
stance, obtaining data from TFL typically requires several rounds
of NDAs and the promise not to re-distribute the data: although
TFL could publish aggregate statistics, it is unlikely they would do
so in real-time (a crucial aspect for mobility analytics) and anyway
this would only capture one aspect of urban mobility—i.e., under-
ground/overground trips but not, e.g., taxis or buses. In general,
collecting locations directly from the users, without requiring them
to forego their privacy, paves the way for a number of novel and in-
teresting analytics, which we are confident our work will support.
4.1 Data Collection
To support private data collection, we need a secure aggregation
protocol that allows a server to only learn aggregate locations. As
discussed in Section 2.4, we choose the one by Melis et al. [28]
as it supports scalability and fault-tolerance without the need for a
trusted third party, which are fundamental factors for the success of
a distributed, crowd-sourcing system.
Our system model mirrors to that of Melis et al. [28], i.e., it con-
sists of a server, or aggregator, that facilitates networking and col-
lects aggregate location counts from a set of mobile users running
the MDD app. There is no other trusted authority. As in [28], we
assume the aggregator and the users to be honest-but-curious, i.e.,
they follow protocol specifications and do not misrepresent their
inputs, but try to extract information from other parties.
When installed, the MDD app generates a private/public key pair
(see setup phase in Section 2.4) and communicates its public part
to the aggregator. After setup, the app runs on the background,
regularly collecting GPS coordinates. At predefined time slots (by
default, every hour), the privacy-preserving aggregation is triggered
by the server, provided that there are at least τ users connected,
which are randomly assigned to groups of u users. In the default
setting, the app maps GPS coordinates to a grid of p× p cells of ρ
square miles, and builds a p × p matrix corresponding to the grid,
setting to 1 items corresponding to ROIs the user has visited in the
1The app Android prototype is available upon request.
specified time slot (and 0 otherwise).2 The values of u, τ , and ρ
are passed onto the user to inform them of the granularity of the
data collection, and give them the option to withdraw (minimum
acceptable values can be adjusted from the MDD’s settings). Next,
as per [28], the app generates blinding factors (summing up to zero)
based on the keys of the users in the same group, and encrypts each
entry in the matrix. Finally, it sends the encrypted matrix to the
aggregator who obliviously aggregates all (encrypted) matrices and
decrypts the aggregate location counts used for the analytic tasks.
Besides recording coordinates, and mapping them onto a
grid, the app can also recognize points of interest, such as
train/underground stations, which is particularly useful for mobil-
ity analytics on transport datasets such as the TFL data. In this
case, the aggregation takes place on a vector where each item cor-
responds to a point of interest and is set to 1 if the user has visited
it in the specified time slot.
4.2 Experimental Evaluation
Next, aiming to assess the real-world deployability of our tech-
niques, we empirically evaluate the performances of the MDD
app, in terms of computation, communication, and energy over-
head. Specifically, we evaluate the overhead imposed by the cryp-
tographic operations needed for the privacy-preserving data col-
lection. We use the mobility datasets from Section 3.1 as guide-
lines for simulating the system. For our experiments, we use the
prototype implementation, in Javascript/Node.js, of the protocol by
Melis et al. [28] and have adapted its client-side to run on Android
using Apache Cordova.3 The cryptographic operations are imple-
mented using elliptic curve cryptography, specifically, the Ed25519
elliptic curve [6] (supporting 256-bit points and offering 128-bit se-
curity) from the Elliptic.js library.4
For the sake of our evaluation, we run the experiments on a mid-
range (rather than a high-end) Android device, as we do not want to
limit deployment only to (possibly higher-income) users that have
newer phones. We use a Samsung Galaxy A3 device, equipped with
a 1.2 GHz quad-core Snapdragon 410 processor and 1.5GB RAM,
running Lollipop v5.0.2. For our energy consumption analysis, we
utilize PowerTutor [1], an Android app for power monitoring. Note
that, although a Javascript implementation of the cryptographic op-
erations might not be optimal in terms of efficiency (e.g., compared
to Java), it offers portability among different mobile OSes. Any-
way, we have actually benchmarked a Java implementation of the
same operations and obtained similar results.
TFL. We start our experiments with the TFL use-case. Recall that
the TFL data involves 582 ROIs (stations), so each user device,
for each time slot t, encrypts a matrix of size 2 · 582, with the
first row indicating entering the station and the second exiting it.
We here remind that the complexity of the aggregation protocol
depends on how many users are assigned to the same group, since
the blinding factors are derived from public keys of other users in
the group. In Figure 10(a), we plot the execution time, measured on
our Android device, of the encryption phase vis-a-vis the number
of users in the group. As expected, running times grow linearly in
the size of the group. For instance, the encryption performed by
each mobile device takes 4.2s with 100 mobile users and 42s with
1,000. Therefore, one should probably keep groups at around 200
users, which offers a reasonable trade-off between granularity (in
terms of privacy) and efficiency. Obviously, even if, say, 1 million
2Note that the app is easily tunable so that, instead of binary values, the
matrix encodes, e.g., duration of user’s presence in each ROI, whether the
user has entered or exited a cell, etc.
3https://cordova.apache.org/
4https://github.com/indutny/elliptic
(a) TFL
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Figure 10: Execution times of the encryption phase for increasing number
of users in (a) TFL and (b) SFC settings.
London commuters were to participate, the system simply scales by
running multiple parallel instances with each group, and combining
multiple aggregates from 5,000 200-user groups.
When assigning users to groups of size 200, in each round of the
protocol, each device has to download 10.7KB worth of public
keys, and transmitting encrypted values for 2 · 582 entries results
in an overhead of 4.54KB (independently of how many users are
in the group). Finally, we measure the energy consumption to be
862mJ for the encryption part, 609mJ to download public keys
via Wi-Fi, and 322mJ to transmit the encrypted matrix. We ob-
serve that the energy overhead is quite small for a modern mobile
phone (for reference we note that downloading a 20KB web page
with Google Chrome via WiFi consumes approximately 800mJ).
SFC. Next, we evaluate complexities considering the SFC use-
case, for which we divide the city of San Francisco into a grid of
100×100 cells. In this setting, our mobile app, for each time slot t,
encrypts a matrix of size 10,000. Figure 10(b) displays the resulting
computational overhead for an increasing number of users. Once
again, we observe execution times linear in the number of users
in the system, i.e., the encryption phase requires about 14s with
100 and 149s with 1,000 users. We also measure communication
and energy overhead, assuming groups of 100 users. Obtaining the
public keys of users in the group requires downloading 5.37KB,
while transferring the encrypted 100×100 matrix requires 39KB,
which, once again, is acceptable for a mobile app. The energy con-
sumption of the cryptographic operations in each protocol round is
485mJ . Finally, the communication operations (via WiFi) require
306mJ and 2769mJ , respectively.
Succinct Data Representation. We observe that the number of
users in each group mainly affects the computation overhead, while
the communication and energy overheads are primarily influenced
by the size of the input. In particular, from our experiments above,
we notice that the computation/communication/energy is apprecia-
bly low when groups are in the order of hundreds of users and ma-
trices are in the order of thousands. This means that if aggregation
is performed over larger inputs, the protocol would quickly incur
high energy, communication, and computation overheads, and this
would remarkably limit the deployability of our techniques.
In fact, even if in the use-cases considered in this paper the over-
head is appreciably low, we would not be able to extend to, e.g.,
building origin-destination matrices [38, 45, 29], rather than only
keeping counts. Origin-destination information is particularly use-
ful to obtain finer grained statistics, e.g., discovering similar loca-
tions for personalized recommendations [11], and/or modeling the
effects of disruptions in a transportation network as in [38]. More
specifically, an origin-destination matrix for the TFL data would be
of size 582 × 582. At each time slot, the app sets element (i, j) in
the matrix to 1 if the user commuted from station i to station j. For
groups of 100 users, this would result in a 7.6s computation over-
head (with 3,387mJ energy overhead) and a relatively high 1.5MB
communication overhead at each protocol round (with 72,704mJ).
However, as discussed in Section 2.4, we can use Count-Min
Sketches to reduce complexities from linear to logarithmic in the
size of the input. That is, we can compress the 582 × 582 origin-
destination matrix into one of size 272 × 11, yielding 4.6s com-
putation (with 461mJ), and 11.6KB (with 823mJ) overhead
when setting  and δ parameters to 0.01. Similarly, for the SFC
dataset, an origin-destination matrix would become very large, i.e.,
104 × 104. Encrypting such a matrix would yield order of 1,000s
computation overhead (and 1,000J) and transferring it would in-
troduce a 39MB overhead (and 2,835J). Obviously, these num-
bers are are prohibitive large for a mobile application. Whereas,
with succinct data representation the matrix size could reduce to
1.9MB (with 138,137mJ transmission overhead), and a compu-
tation overhead of 18s (5,422mJ) when using a Count-Min Sketch
with , δ parameters both set to 0.01.
Accuracy. Finally, we assess the accuracy loss introduced by the
succinct data representation. We start by measuring the error in
the aggregate counts on the TFL data, even though, as discussed
above, the size of the input is sufficiently small that we do not actu-
ally need input compression. Regardless, we do so to determine the
viability of using Count-Min Sketches, i.e., whether or not the error
they introduce would reduce the effectiveness of the analytics, and
the results are very encouraging. When setting the , δ parameters
to the standard 0.01, we notice that the overall accuracy error in
the resulting aggregate counts, over all time slots and all stations,
is in the order of 1%. We also measure how the error “propagates”
on the predictive analytics and, again, do not observe any statis-
tically significant difference: for instance, when we make traffic
forecasts for the 100 busiest stations on March 25 (as done in Sec-
tion 3.2), we measure the average forecast error as 60.81 ± 39.62
using Count-Min Sketches and 59.53± 42.48 without it.
5. RELATED WORK
Mobility Analytics. Zhong et al. [45] propose a metric for captur-
ing variability in commuting trips and analyze urban mobility pat-
terns in London, Singapore, and Beijing, using one-week data of
underground journeys. They show that regularity is exhibited when
considering time intervals longer than 15 minutes, and demonstrate
that peak hours are those with the least variability during a day. Al-
though their analysis results provide useful insights for our work,
the authors do not present any methodology for predicting mobility.
Silva et al. [38] introduce a general framework for predicting traffic
volumes in the London underground: they build a predictive model
for each pair of stations under normal conditions (called the natural
regime) and then extend it to model disruptions like station or line
closures. Their approach is substantially different from ours since
disruptions are actually part of a ground truth dataset they obtain
from London’s transport authority.
Horvitz et al. [20] propose JamBayes, a probabilistic traffic fore-
casting system deployed in the Seattle Greater Area. They collect
highway traffic data and contextual data (e.g., city events), and use
Bayesian structure search to model bottlenecks. Additionally, using
data of historic traffic surprises, in combination with recent data
before an event, their system learns Bayesian networks that infer
the likelihood of a future surprise event. Garzó et al. [17] use dis-
tributed streaming algorithms to process large scale mobility data
and make user mobility predictions on large metropolitan areas.
They evaluate their location prediction methods on a 2-week mo-
bility dataset obtained from the Orange D4D challenge [7]. Yavas¸
et al. [42] use data mining to predict user movements in a mobile
computing system and evaluate their algorithms on a simulated mo-
bidity dataset. Overall, prior work on mobility analytics differ from
ours as they do not consider collecting data directly from users (nor
the privacy implications thereof).
Detecting Traffic Anomalies. In [30], Pan et al. combine mobil-
ity data along with social media to uncover the road network sub-
graph associated with an anomaly, based on the routing behavior of
drivers. Their system is evaluated on the Beijing taxi traces dataset.
Similarly, Thom et al. [41] present a system geared to detect spatio-
temporal anomalies by performing clustering on geolocated Twit-
ter messages and visualize them using tag clouds. They experiment
with three case-studies: an earthquake on the US East Coast, Lon-
don riots, and hurricane Irene. Barria et al. [5] present an anomaly
detection algorithm for road traffic using microscopic traffic vari-
ables like relative speed of vehicles, inter-vehicle time gap, and
lane changing, and evaluate their approach using real-world video
images from a highway segment in Bangkok. Zheng et al. [44] in-
vestigate whether collective detection of anomalies from multiple
spatio-temporal datasets is possible. They propose a probabilistic
anomaly detection method based on a spatio-temporal likelihood
ratio test and evaluate it on five datasets from New York City. Sun
et al. [40] build Markov models on user mobility patterns in a cellu-
lar network, aiming to detect intrusions in the network. Note that,
although we also focus on identifying event mobility anomalies,
unlike these works, we do so using aggregate crowd-sourced loca-
tion data – specifically, collected directly from users in a privacy-
preserving way.
Private Statistics. Prior work has also proposed a number of tools
to privately gather location statistics, however, they do not demon-
strate how these statistics can actually be used for performing mo-
bility analytics, which is one of our main goals. Ho et al. [19] ap-
ply differential privacy to discover interesting geographic locations
on aggregate location data, whereas [27] relies on synthetic data
generation for publishing statistical information about commuting
patterns. Brown et al. [9] propose Haze, a system for privacy-
preserving real time traffic statistics based on jury voting proto-
cols and differential privacy. Their system hides individual data
while allowing aggregate information to be collected at the service
provider. Similarly, Popa et al. [34] present PrivStats, a system
for computing aggregate statistics over location data achieving pri-
vacy and accountability. Kopp et al. [23] also propose a frame-
work enabling the collection of quantitative visits to sets of loca-
tions following a distributed approach. Shi et al. [37] show how an
untrusted data aggregator can learn statistics over multiple partici-
pants’ private data using cryptographic techniques along with a data
randomization procedure for achieving distributed differential pri-
vacy, while Melis et al. [28] demonstrate how to combine privacy-
preserving aggregation with succinct data structures (Count-Min
Sketches [13]) to efficiently compute statistics whilst provably pro-
tecting privacy of single data points. They also consider aggregat-
ing location information as a possible application of their protocols
but do not perform any analytics. PASTE [35] introduces a solution
in a similar setting whereby distributed differential privacy is used
on time series data using a Fourier perturbation algorithm.
Finally, Fan et al. [15] propose FAST, an adaptive system for re-
leasing real-time aggregate statistics with differential privacy. Their
approach is based on a trusted central authority that adaptively sam-
ples the time series according to detected data dynamics to min-
imize the overall privacy budget. They employ Kalman filtering
to predict data at non-sampling points and estimate the true val-
ues from perturbed ones at sampling in order to improve the accu-
racy of data release. In follow-up work [16], they present a generic
differentially-private framework for anomaly detection on aggre-
gate statistics, focusing on detecting epidemic outbreak: real-time
aggregate data is perturbed using FAST [15] and released to an un-
trusted entity that performs the anomaly detection task. Whereas,
we do not use differential privacy to protect users’ privacy, as this
would require the presence of a trusted aggregator and introduce a
trade-off between privacy and utility that is challenging to tune.
6. CONCLUSION
This work investigated the feasibility of performing crowd-
sourced mobility analytics over aggregate location data, in a set-
ting where users periodically report locations to a server, in such
a way that the server can only recover aggregates, thanks to the
use of a privacy-preserving aggregation protocol. We experimented
with real-world mobility datasets obtained from the Transport For
London authority as well as the San Francisco Cabs network, and
demonstrated that aggregate location data can be useful for pre-
dictive analytic tasks like forecasting traffic volumes in regions of
interest (ROIs) and detecting anomalies in them, using a method-
ology based on time series modeling with seasonality. In the pres-
ence of traffic anomalies, we also showed how to enhance their
traffic volume predictions using additional information from cor-
related ROIs. Finally, we proposed a privacy-respecting system
for data collection, and prototyped a mobile application – Mobility
Data Donors (MDD) – which we empirically evaluated in terms of
computation, communication, and energy overhead.
As part of future work, we plan to evaluate our methodology on
different location datasets as well as perform a thorough (differen-
tial) privacy analysis of releasing datasets composed of aggregate
locations, focusing on group sizes and semantic characteristics of
ROIs such as size and density, and their evolution over time.
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